Truthtelling is often viewed as focal in direct mechanisms. We introduce two new notions of robust implementation based on the premise that society may be composed of "primitive" agents who, whenever confronted with a strategy profile, anchor to truthtelling and make a limited number of comparisons. Instead of comparing all possible alternative strategies as they would at a Nash equilibrium, primitive agents only make comparisons with truthtelling. We impose a notion of robustness of implementation when society may contain from primitive to sophisticated agents (who then playà la Nash). We call these (group) resilient implementation. We compare them to well-known conditions that have appeared in the mechanism design literature. Resilient implementation is equivalent to secure implementation, while its group version is linked to a coalitional extension of secure implementation. In contrast to resilient implementation, we show that the latter delivers positive results in many domains and models of interest that we discuss.
Introduction
Implementation theory is concerned with the design of institutions that can channel individuals' incentives towards a planner's or societal goals. The literature has been very successful at addressing this question.
1 Many practical mechanisms with well-known desirable properties have a rather large number of strategies from which the participating agents choose. For instance, high school applicants in New York city submit a ranking of up to 12 programs out of more than 700 to the NYC centralized clearing house. In other words, each student has more than 1.25 × 10 34 possible choices. In auction environments, the set of bids consists of all non-negative numbers. The enormity of the strategy sets in these examples demonstrates that agents do not evaluate all of their strategies. In such cases, can the planner achieve her goal? This is the main concern of this paper.
We rely on Schelling (1960) 's argument that some strategies are more focal than others. To fix ideas, consider two individuals who try to coordinate on a meeting point at an agreed time without necessarily being able to communicate about it. While there are many possible meeting points, some are typically more focal than others. For instance Grand Central Station in New York, or the Eiffel Tower in Paris. Individuals with a poor knowledge of these cities would also find it easier to coordinate on a meeting point that is known by everyone they could ask directions from. There is here several analogies with mechanism design. For instance, when there are many possible strategies and choosing the optimal one may be very time consuming. In such cases, one perhaps should (would) make a limited number of comparisons. This latter fact is very important. In direct mechanisms, truthtelling should be a focal point. Our culture and language prime us into considering the binary choice between truth and lies. Given the uniqueness of truthtelling in the case of direct mechanisms, we believe that truthtelling is a focal point. Thus, we assume that truthtelling factors into each agent's decision making process while other strategies may not.
In order to capture the description of agents' behavior above, we introduce a new notion of equilibrium, coined Truth-reversion proof equilibrium. By the same logic used for Nash equilibrium, any strategy profile from which some agent can deviate profitably cannot arise at equilibrium. However, under truth-reversion proof equilibrium, the deviation is restricted to only truthtelling. Associated with this behavioral equilibrium notion, we define the notion of Truth-reversion proof implementation which is nothing more than full implementation in truth-reversion proof equilibrium. Note that this notion of implementation assumes that society only consists of "primitive" agents who only make comparisons with respect to truthtelling. Implicit in this assumption is that the planner knows that he faces primitive agents. This is a rather demanding and unrealistic assumption. In the spirit of robust implementation and the Wilson's doctrine, we do not want the mechanism to be fully tied to a single feature of behavior. We are in fact interested in a notion of implementation that captures the uncertainty of the planner with respect to the level of sophistication of agents. As such the mechanism used should not depend on the level of sophistication of agents. To ensure this requirement is met, (i) a social alternative not prescribed by the rule cannot be a truth-reversion proof equilibrium (full implementation), and (ii) if the agents are sophisticated, the direct revelation mechanism must have at least one Nash equilibrium that delivers the right outcome. Hence, the robustness notion we use is to impose that a rule is implemented both in truth-reversion proof equilibrium as well as in Nash equilibrium. We call this Resilient implementation.
The adverted reader may already have a few questions and wonder whether this implementation notion is more or less stringent than the simple Nash implementation using direct revelation mechanisms. The answer is that it is much more demanding than the simple Nash implementation requirement. One feature of our result is however surprising. A rule is resilient implementable if and only if it is implementable in truthreversion proof equilibrium: Adding additional layers of comparisons for agents, from the simple truth-reversion like to the full blown requirement of Nash equilibrium does not change the set of implementable rules.
Let us go over our results in more details. We find that resilient implementation is equivalent to secure implementation, a notion introduced by Saijo et al. (2007) . Secure implementation requires double implementation in dominant strategies and Nash equilibria. The motivation for the latter is that a sizable fraction of subjects in experimental studies do not identify their dominant strategies and get stuck at Nash equilibria that deliver the wrong outcome. Indeed a feature of strategy-proof rules is that their direct revelation mechanisms are often plagued with many Nash equilibria that depart from the prescription of the rules. It has been shown that secure implementation is a very demanding notion and rules that are secure implementable often retain the flavor of dictatorial or sequentially dictatorial rules -see for instance Saijo et al. (2007) , Bochet and Sakai (2010) or Fujinaka and Wakayama (2011) . In that regard our implementation also sheds light on the restrictiveness of Saijo et al.'s results: when agents misreport a preference profile, there must exist a profitable reversion to truthtelling for an agent. This is in stark contrast with the standard preference reversal that one would expect from Nash implementation. Here the type of preference reversal that can occur is pinned down: it must be a reversion to truthtelling. The latter was neither discussed nor it was apparent in Saijo et al's characterization. Our results also shed light on the behavioral wedge introduced among strategy-proof rules by secure implementation. Recall that the latter is motivated by the fact that rules which fail the secure implementation requirement do not work well in practice -see Cason et al. (2006) for some experimental evidence. A rule that is secure implementable is expected to work well in practice because it is equivalent to a notion of robust implementation with primitive agents -see also the recent paper by Li (2016) for an alternative strengthening of strategy-proofness based on agents' cognitive limitations.
We next consider the possibility of communication or collusion among agents while retaining the spirit of agents making limited comparisons. To achieve this, we replace the notion of Nash equilibrium with its strong version (Aumann, 1959) and introduce Group truth-reversion proof equilibrium. A rule is implementable in group truth-reversion proof equilibrium if and only if it satisfies both strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare. A key feature of the result is the observation that in many cases, a Nash equilibrium which delivers the wrong outcome can be broken once coalitional reversion to truthtelling are possible. In terms of double implementation, unlike in its unilateral form, Group resilient implementation is not always equivalent to implementation in group truth-reversion proof equilibrium. Indeed a rule may be implementable in the latter case while not having any strong Nash equilibrium, thereby failing the former requirement. However, note that group strategy-proof rules -a well-known coalitional version of strategy-proofnessalways admit truthtelling as a strong Nash equilibrium. Hence whenever a rule is group strategy-proof and implementable in group truth-reversion equilibrium, it is also group resilient implementable, although group strategy-proofness is not a necessary condition for group resilient implementation. We are however able to recover equivalence for some preference domains and model of interests. For instance when preferences are strict, implementation in group truth-reversion proof equilibrium is equivalent to group resilient implementation. Many rules which are not resilient implementable are group resilient implementable. For instance all the trading cycle rules identified in Pycia andÜnver (forthcoming) are group resilient implementable, a sharp contrast with Fujinaka and Wakayama (2011) who find that only priority rules are secure implementable. Likewise in the Sprumont model (Sprumont, 1991) , under efficiency, group truth-reversion proof equilibrium is equivalent to group resilient implementation are again equivalent. The class of rules which under the latter equivalence is large and includes the sequential allotment rules (Barbera et al., 1997) , the fixed path rules (Moulin, 1980) , all of which contain the celebrated uniform rule (Sprumont, 1991) . In contrast Bochet and Sakai (2010) show that the only secure implementable rules within the fixed path rules are the sequential dictatorship rules. Thus our results also show that many of the negative results obtained under secure implementation vanish once coalitional moves are possible.
Instead of specific models encountered in the literature, we also look at a more general environment based on the notion of a rich domain of preferences. We show that under the latter group resilient implementation is equivalent to group truth-reversion proof implementability. We close by tying group resilient implementation to a coalitional version of secure implementation based on strong Nash equilibrium. We find that the former implies the latter for group strategy-proof rules but in general, neither implies that other.
As we mentioned earlier, our equilibrium notion is closely related to the one of Nash equilibrium. There agents are fully rational which is captured by two features of agents' behavior, (i) the best responses of agents to their own beliefs, and (ii) that those beliefs turn out to be correct at equilibrium. There have been attempts to drop one of these two items. For instance, rationalizable implementation (Bergemann et al. (2011) drops item (ii) but retain the best response feature of agents' behavior. Under the spirit of our notion, one can justify playing any strategy as long as it yields a better payoff than truthtelling for some belief. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition for implementation in this modified rationalizable strategies. For responsive rules, this implementation concept is equivalent to the one in strict dominant strategies which is extremely demanding.
Moving away from the implementation approach, one can think also about the focality of truthtelling as a property which is directly imposed on decision rules. One of the most sought-after properties for rules is strategy-proofness which asserts that a rule is nonmanipulable by rational agents, or equivalently that truthtelling is a dominant strategy (Nash equilibrium) in the direct revelation mechanism associated with the rule. This is the content of the so-called revelation principle. While the quest for appealing strategyproof rules has been very successful, strategy-proof rules are typically put in the same indifference class in terms of eliciting truthtelling. Hence if one relies on the revelation principle, on the ground of truthtelling all strategy-proof rules are "equivalent". We introduce two new properties of decision rules which we call reversion and group reversion. These state that whenever a rule differ at some preference report from the truthtelling outcome, an agent (or group) can always gain by reverting to truthtelling. Reversion and its group version both imply strategy-proofness and serve as a robustness check on rules. Our results show that strategy proof rules differ in terms of the prominence of truthtelling. Specifically, an individual or a group always benefits through a truth-reversion from any undesirable outcomes in only some strategy-proof rules. This contributes to the performance of strategy-proof rules in practice, much as Li (2016)'s notion of obvious strategy-proof rules -in particular once one makes the connection between the results on (group) reversion and the ones on implementation in the first part of the paper. We offer an extensive discussion of this issue in the last section of the paper. We complement it with a set of results which offer a new interpretation of the results obtained with the implementation approach.
Finally our paper contributes to the burgeoning literature which recognizes agents' possible behavioral or cognitive limitations. In a seminal paper, Eliaz (2002) introduces faulty agents -the ones whose actions are unpredictable -in the implementation framework.
2 In our setting, agents are neither as rational as in the Nash implementation framework nor unpredictable as in Eliaz (2002) . Dutta and Sen (2012) consider so-called partially honest agents who have a preference for honesty. Although truthtelling or honesty factors into agents' decision making process in our setting, they do not have any preference for it. The paper proceeds as follows. We introduce the model, the new implementation notions and the equivalence between resilient implementation and implementation in truth-reversion proof equilibrium in Section 2. We devote Section 3 to the study of group truth-reversion proof equilibrium implementation and group resilient implementation. In Section 4, we provide some discussion. We conclude in Section 5 and relegate some of our proofs to the Appendix.
Setup
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents. Let A = A 1 × . . . × A n be a set of alternatives.
For i ∈ N , we call A i agent i's individual set of alternatives. We assume that if A i ⊆ R m and |A i | = ∞, then A i is convex. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ A be an alternative and
If alternative x is such that for all i, j ∈ N , x i = x j = α, then we denote x = α1. Next, let X ⊆ A be the set of feasible alternatives. If for all x ∈ X there exists α such that x = α1, then the set of feasible alternatives X determines a public goods economy. Otherwise, the set of feasible alternatives X determines an economy with at least one private goods component. Hence, our model encompasses public and private goods economies.
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To fix ideas, let us give two examples. It will be clear from these examples that given the set A of alternatives, the set X of feasible alternatives fully determines whether we are working with a public or private goods model. Note that the Cartesian product notation we use for the set of alternatives is for notational convenience only; none of our results require it.
Example 2.1. Let A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } × . . . × {a 1 , . . . , a n }.
Public Goods Model: Suppose that the agents have to choose one candidate out of the set {a 1 , . . . , a n } of possible candidates. Then, X = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N, x i = x j }. Private Goods Model: On the other hand, if agents have to allocate the set of indivisible objects or tasks {a 1 , . . . , a n } among themselves, then X = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N, x i = x j }.
Public Goods Model: Suppose that the agents have to choose a single point in the interval [0,1] that everyone will consume without rivalry, e.g., a public facility on a street (see Moulin, 1980) . Then, X = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N, x i = x j }. Private Goods Model: On the other hand, if agents have to choose a division of one unit of an infinitely divisible good among themselves (see Sprumont, 1991) , then feasibility is determined by the size of the resource and X = {x ∈ A : for all i ∈ N, x i ≥ 0 and i∈N x i = 1}.
For all i ∈ N , preferences are represented by a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation R i over A i . As usual, for all a, b ∈ A i , a R i b is interpreted as "i weakly prefers a to b", a P i b as "i strictly prefers a to b", and a I i b as "i is indifferent between a and b".
is the set of elements of A i that are top-ranked under R i by agent i. Preferences R i on A i ⊆ R are single-peaked if p(R i ) ∈ A i is a singleton and for all x i , y i ∈ A i satisfying either
For public goods models, preferences R i over the individual set of alternatives A i can easily be extended to preferences over the set of alternatives A (since each agent consumes the same public alternative). Whenever our model captures a private goods component, we assume that agents only care about their own consumption. Then, for both public and private goods models, we can easily extend preferences R i over the individual set of alternatives A i to preferences over the set of alternatives A (both preference relations only depend on agent i's consumption in A i ). Therefore, from now on, we use R i to describe agent i's preferences over A i as well as over A, i.e., we use both notations x R i y and x i R i y i . Note that for private goods models, strict preferences over A i do not need to be strict over A. we let p(R) = (p(R 1 ), ..., p(R n )) denote the profile of peaks at preference profile R.
A typical preference profile is R = (R i ) i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , R i ∈ R i . Profile R ∈ R N , is often written as (R i , R −i ), where
given preference profile R ∈ R N , we use the usual notations that R S ≡ (R i ) i∈S and
Likewise, for each S ⊂ N , we let R S be the domain of preference profiles for S. Similar notations are used for R. We say that alternative x weakly dominates y via group S ⊂ N at profile R if x R i y for all i ∈ S and x P j y for at least one j ∈ N . If everyone in S strictly prefers x to y then x dominates y. The notations wdom[R, S] and dom[R, S] denote the weak dominance and dominance at profile via group S.
Let the set of alternatives A, the set of feasible alternatives X and the domain of preference profile R N be given. A decision rule f : R N → X is a function that assigns an alternative f (R) ∈ X for each preference profile R ∈ R N . For each R ∈ R N , and each i ∈ N , we let f i (R) be what is alloted to i at f (R). Obviously if the model is a public
In this paper we restrict our attention to the direct revelation mechanism associated with a given rule f . That is, each agent i sends a preference report R i ∈ R i to the planner who then pools the agents' reports and selects the implemented outcome according to f , i.e., f (R). Furthermore, we also only consider pure strategies.
Truth-Reversion and Resilient Implementation
In game theory, Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile from which no agent profits through unilateral deviations. Let us define formally the Nash equilibrium in our setting.
Nash Equilibrium: Fix a decision rule f . A message profileR is a Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism at profile
be the set of Nash equilibria of the direct mechanism at R.
To this day, Nash equilibrium remains almost the exclusive choice in predicting the outcomes of simultaneous strategic situations. The rationale is that a game cannot end at a non-Nash equilibrium strategy profile because some agent will deviate from this profile profitably. However, identifying such deviations can be very difficult. The larger the strategy set is for an agent, the more comparisons she has make to deviate from a non-Nash equilibrium outcome. In such cases, due to time constraints, agents should and would make only a limited number of comparisons. If no agent does improve over a non-Nash equilibrium profile during such a limited number of comparisons, then we believe that this profile could arise as an outcome. Clearly, this leads to a new question: What strategies should agents consider? Perhaps answering this question accurately is impossible. However, in the context of direct revelation mechanism, we believe that truthtelling is always one of the strategies every agent considers. Our language and culture prime us to weigh the binary choice of truth and lies. There is only way to reveal one's preferences truthfully but there are many ways to lie. In this sense, truthtelling is a focal point. Thus, we believe that any non-Nash equilibrium strategy in the direct revelation mechanism does not arise as an equilibrium outcome if some agent finds profitable to revert to truthtelling. With this motivation in mind, we define a new equilibrium notion below.
Truth-Reversion Proof Equilibrium: Fix a decision rule f . A message profileR is a truth-reversion proof equilibrium (TRP equilibrium) in the direct mechanism at R ∈ R N if there exists no agent i for whom f i (R i ,R −i ) P i f i (R). Let T RP E(R) be the set of TRP equilibria in the direct mechanism at R.
TRP equilibrium requires that agents compare a given profile to only truthtelling. Hence, each agent makes at most one comparison. In this sense, we call these agents primitive. Nash equilibrium on the other hand requires that agents to compare a given strategy profile to all possible deviations. Consequently, we call the agents under Nash equilibrium sophisticated. One could think of agents who are somewhere between the two extremes. Such agents consider deviations beyond truthtelling but not all of the possible ones. One thing to observe here is that no profile which is not a TRP equilibrium can be an equilibrium outcome of a direct revelation mechanism regardless of the participants' sophistication level: if primitive agents reject a strategy profile, then so will the more sophisticated agents. On the other hand, a Nash equilibrium can arise as an outcome regardless of the sophistication level: if sophisticated agents cannot reject then neither will the less sophisticated agents.
We also point out that the set of TRP equilibria is not empty. Indeed because primitive agents compare any strategy profile to only truth-reversion, truthtelling is automatically a TRP equilibrium, i.e, R ∈ T RP E(R) for each R ∈ R. On the other hand, it is well-known that the set of Nash equilibria could be empty.
Finally, we acknowledge that our notion is silent on how a TRP equilibrium is reached. This issue is also present for Nash equilibrium. Thus, the usual justifications for Nash equilibrium, e.g., steady state play or self-enforcement, also apply to our notion. In Section 4, we discuss how one can modify classical equilibrium notions such as rationalizable strategies while retaining the spirit of our notion that agents anchor on truthtelling.
We now define our first implementation notion.
Remark 2.3. Evaluating if a rule is TRP implementable is rather simple. Specifically, for anyR and R with f (R) = f (R), one needs to consider if there is an agent i for whom
The difficulty level involved for checking this condition is similar to the one of checking strategy-proofness which we will define shortly.
TRP implementation implicitly assumes that the society consists of primitive agents. In addition, the planner knows this fact. Of course, these assumptions are unrealistic. We are interested in the implementation problem of a planner who does not know the sophistication level of the agents. Hence, the planner should strive to have a direct revelation mechanism whose outcome does not depend on the sophistication level of the agents. To ensure this, two requirements should be met: First, any social alternative not prescribed by the decision rule in question cannot be a TRP equilibrium. Second, if the agents are sophisticated, the direct revelation mechanism must have at least one Nash equilibrium that delivers the desired social outcome. These two requirements insure that regardless of the agents' sophistication level, (i) the direct mechanism does not result in a "bad" outcome and (ii) the mechanism has at least one equilibrium.
Resilient Implementation: A decision rule f is resilient implementable if for each R,
Observe here that resilient implementation is just a requirement of double implementation in both Nash and TRP equilibria.
We also consider the cases in which agents can communicate among themselves prior to sending their messages. Here, agents can form groups and coordinate on their deviations. Hence, we adjust our equilibrium and implementation notions to account group deviations. The motivations for the adjusted notions remain the same as for the original ones.
Strong Nash Equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) : Fix a decision rule f . A message profilẽ R is a strong Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism at profile R ∈ R N , if
be the set of strong Nash equilibria at profile R.
Group Truth-Reversion Proof Equilibrium: Fix a decision rule f . A message profileR is a group truth-reversion proof equilibrium (GTRP equilibrium) in the direct mechanism at R ∈ R N if there exists no coalition S for whom
Let GT RP E(R) be the set of GTRP equilibria in the direct mechanism at R.
for all R andR ∈ GRT P E(R).
Observe here that we required domination, not weak domination, in the definition of GTRP equilibrium. Regardless of which domination is used, truthtelling is a GRTP equilibrium. On the other hand, by using dominance, whenever a profile is not a GTRP equilibrium, some group S will have an unambiguous incentive to revert to truthtelling. Consequently, TRP implementation is more demanding because of the use of dominance.
Another observation is that GTRP implementation is less demanding than TRP implementation. This is because (i) each GTRP equilibrium is also a TRP equilibrium, and (ii) truthtelling is both a TRP and a GTRP equilibrium.
In the next sections, we will show that resilient implementation is equivalent to TRP implementation. A similar result holds for the group versions of these two notions in many problems of interest. Below we present a preliminary result which shows that the well-known strategy-proofness property is necessary for GTRP implementation.
Strategy-Proofness: A decision rule f is strategy-proof if for each R ∈ R N , i ∈ N and
Lemma 2.4. If a decision rule f is GTRP implementable, then f is strategy-proof.
Proof. In contrast to the lemma suppose that f is not strategy-proof. This means that there must exist i ∈ N , R ∈ R N andR i ∈ R i such that
Then by GTRP implementability, there must exist
Because the preferences for each j = i are the same under both (R S , R −S ) and
a contradiction with (1).
Note that strategy-proofness implies neither notions of implementation. This fact will become clear next when we show that both implementation notions are equivalent to some combinations of strategy-proofness and other widely used concepts in the mechanism design literature. We start with the characterization of the individual version of resilient implementation.
TRP vs. Resilient Implementation
We first show that resilient implementation is equivalent to implementation in truthreversion proof equilibrium.
Theorem 2.5. A rule f is resilient implementable if and only if f is TRP implementable.
Proof. We pointed out earlier that resilient implementation is the requirement of double implementation in Nash and TRP equilibria. In addition, each Nash equilibrium is also a TRP equilibrium. Thus, to prove this theorem it suffices to show that N E(R) is not empty for each R. From Lemma 2.4, we know that f is strategy-proof. Consequently,
The theorem above means that if a rule is implementable in societies with primitive agents then the rule is also implementable in societies with more sophisticated agents. In other words, if the planner is not aware of the sophistication level of the participating agents, then she needs to design the mechanism for primitive agents. This would ensure the success of the mechanism for more sophisticated agents.
From technical perspective, Theorem 2.5 is also interesting: double implementation in different equilibrium notions usually leads to more stringent requirements than the combined ones for implementation in each equilibrium notion. However, this is not the case for double implementation in Nash and TRP equilibria.
We now identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for resilient implementation. We already know that strategy-proofness is necessary. Is any other condition necessary? For this, we introduce the rectangular property of Saijo et al. (2007) .
Rectangular Property: A decision rule f satisfies the rectangular property if for each
Theorem 2.6. A decision rule f is resilient implementable if and only if f satisfies both strategy-proofness and the rectangular property.
Proof. Due to Theorem 2.5, proving this theorem is the same as showing strategyproofness and the rectangular property are necessary and sufficient for TRP implementation. We already know that TRP requires strategy-proofness. It is also clear that the rectangular property is necessary. For this, consider R andR such that for each i ∈ N ,
Next we show that the combination of strategy-proofness and the rectangular property is sufficient for TRP implementation. Pick R andR ∈ T RP E(R). By strategy proofness and the definition of TRP equilibrium, we must have
By the rectangular property, f (R) = f (R).
As emphasized in Saijo et al. (2007) , many strategy-proof rules of interest violate the rectangular property. Consequently, resilient implementation is rather demanding. We present here cases where the failure of the rectangular property is salient. We focus on three different examples. The first two show how the failure of resilient implementation may not carry to group-resilient implementation. The last example nevertheless shows that for some models even group-resilient implementation is out of reach.
Example 2.7. Structure and coalitional instability of bad Nash equilibria I
n : for all i ∈ N, x i ≥ 0 and i∈N x i = Ω} where Ω ∈ R ++ . The preference domain R N is the one of single-peaked preferences over [0, Ω] . This model is known as the Sprumont Model (Sprumont, 1991) of division under single-peaked preferences. A rule that is central in this model is the so-called Uniform rule f U , defined for each R ∈ R N and each i ∈ N as,
It is well-known that the uniform rule is strategy-proof. However, it fails to be resilient implementable as shown below.
Let n = 3, Ω = 6 and pick R ∈ R N with peak profile p(R) = (1, 2, 4). Consider f U on the domain R N and let us show that f is not resilient. For instance, considerR with p(R) = (2, 2, 2). By reverting to truthtelling unilaterally, neither agent 1 nor 3 can change the outcome and f U is therefore not resilient implementable. Notice that
Agents 1 and 3 have the joint profitable deviation of simply reporting their true preferences so that the true uniform allocation is obtained. One can verify that there are an infinity of joint misreports at which f U delivers a bad outcome -all of these are in fact Nash equilibrium reports-which are described by the following sets,
Observe here that for each of these reports, agents 1 and 3 improve by jointly reverting to truthtelling. We will later show that the uniform rule is group-resilient implementable.
Example 2.8. Structure and coalitional instability of bad Nash equilibria II
.., h n } for each i ∈ N and X = {x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) ∈ A : x i = x j for each i = j}, i.e., X determines a private good economy with indivisible goods, as in example 2.1. Let the preference domain R N be the set of strict preferences over {h 1 , ..., h n }. Pick f T T C to be the top-trading cycle rule in which each agent i is endowed with object h i .
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Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {h 1 , h 2 , h 3 } 3 . Let the set of preferences be as follows:
is determined according to the following process:
Step m: Each agent who have not been allocated an object in the previous steps points to the agent who owns her/his most preferred object among those which are not assigned to any agent yet. There exist at least one cycle of agents {i 1 , ·, i k } such that each i l where l < k points to i l+1 while i k points to i 1 . Under the TTC rule, each agent in a cycle is allocated the object of the agent to whom she points.
The above process is terminated once every agent is allocated an object.
Observe here that the TTC rule f T T C gives the following allocations:
When the state is R = (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ), truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium. Consider now the joint misreport (R 1 ,R 2 , R 3 ) which results in (h 1 , h 3 , h 2 ). Clearly, agent 3 has no incentive to unilaterally deviate as she obtains her top choice under this preference report. If either agent 1 or 2 unilaterally deviates from (R 1 ,R 2 , R 3 ) to truthtelling, then the outcome
implementable. However, agents 1 and 2 jointly reverting from (R 1 ,R 2 ) to (R 1 , R 2 ) (while agent 3 reports R 3 ) leads to allocation (h 2 , h 1 , h 3 ). This is a profitable deviation for both agents. We will later show that a large class of trading cycles rule are group-resilient implementable.
Our last example shows that some decision rules of interest are neither resilient nor group-resilient implementable. In particular our example shows that auction models will remain out of reach even if one considers group-resilient implementation.
Example 2.9. Failure of Group-Resilient Implementation
n × R n : i∈N x i = 1}. The feasible set X stands for a model in which there is one object to be given to one out of the n agents, and monetary transfers are possible. Let rule f V be the Vickrey rule, i.e., the second price auction.
Let R N = R + . For each i ∈ N , each preference relation R i is indexed by a real number that stands for the valuation agent i attaches to the object. With a slight abuse of notation, each R i is such that for (x, t), (x, t ) with t > t , then (
, and x i = 0 otherwise, (ii)
, and t i = 0 otherwise. While the Vickrey rule is strategy-proof, it fails to be resilient as shown below.
Let n = 2 and fix a preference profile R with R 1 > R 2 . The joint report (R 1 , R 2 ) is a weakly dominant strategy: agent 1 receives the object and pays t 2 = R 2 while agent 2 pays nothing. However there is an infinity of joint misreports at which resilience fails -all of these are in fact Nash equilibrium reports-which are described by the following set,
Because agent 2 gets a non-negative payoff at R when the report is (R 1 ,R 2 ), this joint lie is a Nash equilibrium at R. Within the above set, reverting to truthtelling from (R 1 ,R 2 ) = (0,R 2 ) jointly is not profitable for both agents.
Based on the series of examples, it is clear that resilient implementation is very demanding. From Examples 2.7 and 2.8 we conclude that for many models and rules of interest there may exist a coalition of agents which can benefit by reverting to truthtelling even though no individual agent can profitably revert to truthtelling. Hence, in many models, the requirement imposed by resilient implementation is too strong if pre-play communication is allowed. Theorem 3.1 introduced in the next section will show under which conditions the above conclusion is true.
Let us now tie resilient implementation to secure implementation. Saijo et al. (2007) show that the rectangular property is a necessary condition for secure implementation. The latter is motivated by the lack of dominant strategy play for rules that admit unwanted Nash equilibria in their direct revelation mechanisms. We provide a definition below.
Definition 2.10. [Dominant Strategies] Fix a decision rule f . A profileR is a (weakly) dominant message of the direct revelation mechanism at state R if for each i ∈ N and R i , ∈ R i , we have that f (R) R i f (R i ,R −i ). For each R ∈ R N , let DS(R) be the set of dominant strategies.
Definition 2.11. [Secure Implementation] A decision rule f is secure implementable
In words, rule f is secure implementable if truthtelling is a dominant strategy in the direct revelation mechanism associated to f , and for any Nash equilibrium reportR at profile R, it must be that f (R) = f (R). Note that secure implementation is nothing more than the requirement of double implementation in dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium.
It is not difficult to see that a rule is secure implementable if and only if it is resilient implementable. If a preference reportR is a Nash equilibrium in the direct revelation game associated with a resilient implementable rule f at profile R thenR must deliver the desired outcome f (R). In addition, because f is strategy-proof by Lemma 2.4, truthtelling is a dominant strategy for the direct revelation game. Based on Theorem 2.6 and given Saijo et al. (2007) 's characterization in terms of strategy-proofness and the rectangular property, we obtain a new characterization of the class of secure implementable rules.
Theorem 2.12. Secure Implementation A decision rule f is secure implementable if and only if f is resilient implementable.
An interesting by-product of the theorem is a direct characterization of secure implementation in the form of a straightforward and intuitive condition. Indeed the criterion provided in Remark 2.3 to determine the resilient implementability of a rule is much easier to check in practice than both strategy-proofness and the rectangular property. The magnitude of difficulty involved with checking resilient implementation is similar to checking strategy-proofness.
GTRP and Group Resilient Implementations
We start this section by studying GTRP implementation and then move to group resilient implementation.
GTRP Implementation
In this section, we identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for GTRP implementation and compare these conditions to the ones we obtained for TRP implementation. For this purpose, we find useful to invoke the result from Saijo et al. (2007) that shows the equivalence between the rectangular property and the combination of the outcome rectangular property and non-bossiness in welfare. We define these conditions below.
Non-bossiness in welfare: A decision rule f satisfies non-bossiness in welfare if when-
Outcome rectangular property: A decision rule f satisfies the outcome rectangular
We now show that the necessary and sufficient conditions for GTRP implementation are strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare.
Theorem 3.1. A decision rule f is implementable in group truth-reversion proof equilibrium if and only if f satisfies both strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare. 7 Saijo et.al. (2007) labels this condition simply as non-bossiness.
Proof. We start with the necessity part of our proof. Due to Lemma 2.4, we need to only show that any GTRP implementable rule f satisfies non-bossiness in welfare. In contrast, suppose that this is not the case. Then there must exist i ∈ N , R ∈ R N and
Because f is GTRP implementable, there must exist S such that f (R S , R −S ) P j f (R i , R −i ) for all j ∈ S. Because the preferences for each j = i are the same under both (R S , R −S ) and (R i , R −i ), it must be that i ∈ S. Consequently,
which is a contradiction with (2).
We now prove the sufficiency part. Let R,R ∈ R N be such that f (R) = f (R).
Suppose that there exists some i ∈ N andR i ∈ R i such that f (R i ,R −i ) P i f (R). This fact and strategy-proofness of
Next, suppose that there does not exist such an agent i for whom
Let T ⊂ N with |T | = t be the subset of agents who lie atR,
The following claim is crucial for our proof.
Claim: Fix any nonnegative integer
The claim above, which we prove below, immediately yields that either (a) there exists some S ⊆ T with f (R S ,R −S ) P i f (R) for all i ∈ S or (b) f (R T ,R −T ) = f (R). In the latter case, f (R) = f (R) (recall (R T ,R −T ) = (R T , R −T )). This would contradict our assumption that f (R) = f (R). Thus, the only possible case is (a) which concludes the proof of the sufficiency part.
Proof of the Claim. Let us prove the claim when s = 0. Fix any S ⊂ T with |S| = 1. By construction, S = {i} for some i ∈ T . By the Nash equilibrium assumption of R = (R S , R −S ) at R, we have
And by strategy-proofness,
By combining the two relations above, we obtain that
Because f satisfies non-bossiness in welfare, we have
This means that (ii) in the claim is always satisfied if s = 0. Now fix any s with 0 < s < t. Pick any S ⊆ T with |S| = s + 1. Because of the strategy-proofness of f , we know that f (R S ,R −S ) R i f (R S\i ,R i ,R −S ) for all i ∈ S. By construction, |S \ i| = s. By the assumption used in the claim, f (R S\i ,R i ,R −S ) = f (R). Consequently,
If the relation above holds for everyone with a strict one, then we are in (i) of the claim. If not, there must be at least one agent i for whom
Then because f is non-bossy in welfare, we obtain
which is (ii) of the claim. This completes the proof.
While strategy-proofness is central in the mechanism design literature, non-bossiness in welfare is typically used to achieve different objectives, in particular to provide structure and tractability to different classes of rules in characterization theorems.
8 Here, non-bossiness in welfare inherits a somewhat unexpected strategic interpretation. While implementation in group truth-reversion proof equilibrium looks like a stringent requirement, it turns out to be no more demanding than two properties that have been regularly invoked in the literature.
Group Resilient Implementation
We now will study group resilient implementation, which is robust to the sophistication level of agents. It turns out that the necessary and sufficient conditions are no more demanding for this implementation notion than the ones for GTRP implementation in many problems of interest. This means again that the planner who does not know the sophistication level of the participating agents should design a mechanism that delivers the right outcomes when the agents are primitive. Let us first closely look into when a GTRP implementable rule f fails to be group resilient implementable. This could only happen if f does not have any strong Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the group-resilient implementability of f follows if one ensures that there is a strong Nash equilibrium in the direct revelation mechanism. We know that group strategy-proof rules have at least one strong Nash equilibrium which is truthtelling. This observation is the basis of our further analysis.
Group Strategy-Proofness: A decision rule f satisfies group strategy-proofness if for each R ∈ R N and coalition S ⊆ N , there does not exist R S ∈ R S such that
Theorem 3.2. If rule f is group strategy-proof and GTRP implementable then f is group resilient implementable.
Proof. By the definition of group-strategy-proofness, it is immediate that R ∈ SN E(R). This combined with the fact f is GTRP implementable, we find that f is group-resilient implementable.
Apart from being a missing link between GTRP and group resilient implementations, group strategy-proofness is a desirable property in group resilient implementable rules for two reasons. First, truthtelling is unequivocally focal in the sense that regardless of the participants' sophistication level, (a) no coalition of agents can profitably deviate from truthtelling and (b) there always exist some coalition that would gain by reverting to truthtelling from any report that is not prescribed by f . In other words, truthtelling is very likely to arise in the direct revelation mechanism associated with f when communication is allowed among agents. Second, rules that are both group strategy-proof and group resilient are self-enforceable in the spirit of coalition proof Nash equilibria (D. Bernheim and Whinston, 1987) . That is, any coalition which benefits by reverting to truthtelling from a collective misreport does not have to worry about further deflections by its members, thanks to group strategy-proofness.
We note here that group strategy-proofness is not necessary for group resilient implementation. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 3.3 (Group Strategy-Proofness is not necessary for group resilient implementation). Let N = {1, 2, 3} and X = {a, b, c, d, e, g}. Suppose that the set of preferences is R i ∪R i ∪R i for agent i = 1, 2 and R i ∪R i for i = 3 where
The decision rule f is as follows:
9 This version of group-strategy proofness is sometimes called strong group strategy proofness. Its weaker version which is consistent with our definition of strong Nash equilibrium requires that there exists no coalition that improves all of its members by deviating from truthtelling in each state. Under both versions of group strategy-proofness, GTRP implementation implies group resilient implementation. We opted for the stronger version because it is equivalent to some well-known properties in specific domains.
Agent 3
It is easy to see that f is both strategy-proof and non-bossy in welfare. Thus, f is GTRP implementable. In addition, (R 1 ,R 2 ,R 3 ) (which results in a) is a SNE in state R while truthtelling is SNE in all other states. Consequently, f is group resilient implementable. However, f is not group strategy-proof: at state R, agents 1 and 2 can deviate to (R 1 ,R 2 ) and improve.
The above example shows that group resilient implementation does not require group strategy-proofness. However, it is not clear how large the class of rules that are group resilient implementable yet not group strategy-proof is. We are not aware of any prominent rules in the literature which are in this class. The group resilient implementable rules which we identify in widely-studied problems are all group strategy-proof.
We find that the following weaker version of non-bossiness in welfare is instrumental in our further analysis.
Non-Bossiness: A decision rule f satisfies non-bossiness if whenever
Next we identify group resilient implementable rules in two problems, the allocation of private goods under strict preferences (e.g., Shapley-Scarf economies) and the allocation of a stock of resource under single peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) . We then provide a more general result under a notion of richness of the preference domains.
Strict Preference Domain
In this domain, non-bossiness in welfare and its weaker version, non-bossiness, are equivalent. Thus, a rule is GTRP implementable if and only if it satisfies both strategy-proofness and non-bossiness. Furthermore, in the private goods model considered in Example 2.8, the combination of non-bossiness and strategy-proofness is equivalent to group strategyproofness (Pápai, 2000) . Thus, we obtain the following corollary thanks to Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.4. Let R N be the strict preference domain and let X determine a private good economy as defined in Example 2.8. A decision rule f is group resilient implementable if and only if f is group strategy-proof.
Given that we have translated requirements for resilient and group-resilient implementable rules in terms of conditions regularly used in the literature, we can compare the sets of resilient and group-resilient implementable rules. Fujinaka and Wakayama (2011) show that the only secure implementable efficient rules in the so-called housing model are the priority rules which allocate objects based on a fixed ordering of the set of agents.
10 Therefore, efficiency -perhaps the most important criteria -along with resilient implementability lead to an incredibly restrictive set of priority rules. On the other hand, Pycia andÜnver (forthcoming) show that any group-strategy proof and efficient rule is a trading cycle rule. The set of such rules includes Gale's top trading cycles rules -a prominent rule in the so-called house allocation literature. 11 Consequently, the set of group-resilient implementable and efficient rules is the one of trading cycles rules -a considerable enlargement over the set of priority rules.
Out of the three necessary conditions for secure implementation or resilient implementation, our results show that the outcome rectangular property can be completely dispensed with for group resilient implementability.
Before we go to our next preference domain, let us remark that non-bossiness is vacuously satisfied in public goods models in strict preference domains. As a result, group resilient implementability in such models is equivalent to strategy-proofness.
Single-Peaked Domain
Let us now turn our attention to the Sprumont model introduced in Examples 2.2 and 2.7. We first show that group strategy-proofness is necessary for GTRP implementation. Recall that Ω ∈ R ++ is the stock of the resource. The feasible set of allocations is X = {x ∈ A : i x i = Ω}.
Lemma 3.5. Let R N be the single-peaked preferences domain and let X determine the feasible set of the Sprumont model. If a decision rule f is GTRP implementable then it satisfies group strategy-proofness.
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Proof. Because f is GTRP implementable, f satisfies strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare. In contradiction to the lemma, let f satisfy both strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare but not group strategy-proofness. Consequently, there exist
. By Lemma 5.1 (see the appendix), f is peak-only. LetR ∈ R N be a preference profile such that 
Now pick any j ∈ S and j = i. Because f (R i , R −i ) = f (R), by following the same steps as above, we obtain that f (R {i,j} , R −{i,j} ) = f (R i , R −i ) = f (R). By continuing with the same logic, it must be that f (R S , R −S ) = f (R).
We now move from (R S , R −S ) to (R S , R −S ) by changing the preferences of agents in S, one at a time. We claim that at each step of this process, the allocation prescribed by f remains unaffected. To see this select any i ∈ S and consider (R i ,R S\{i} , R −S ). By the strategy-proofness of f , we must have that
Thus, by non-bossiness we have that f (R i ,R S\{i} , R −S ) = f (R S , R −S ). By employing similar arguments for the remaining steps of the process, we find that f (R S , R −S ) = f (R S , R −S ). This contradicts the earlier conclusion that
The lemma above and Theorem 3.2 yield that group resilient and GTRP implementations are equivalent. Furthermore, due to Theorem 3.1 we obtain that non-bossiness in welfare and strategy-proofness are necessary and sufficient conditions for resilient implementation. Given the importance of this result, we state it as a theorem.
Theorem 3.6. Let R N be the single-peaked preferences domain and let X determine the feasible set of the Sprumont model. A rule f is group resilient implementable if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare.
We note that unlike in the Scarf-Shapley economies, group strategy-proofness is not sufficient for group resilient implementation in the Sprumont model. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 3.7. Group strategy-proofness does not imply group resilient implementation Let N = {1, 2} and consider the following rule which yields two outcomes: x = (Ω, 0) or y = (0, Ω). If x and y are Pareto comparable in the weak sense at any profile R then f assigns the better outcome. If both agents are indifferent between x and y, then f prescribes x. If none of these conditions are satisfied, f prescribes x or y depending on which of the two agent 1 prefers.
Clearly, f is group strategy-proof but it violates non-bossiness in welfare. Thus, f is neither GTRP nor group resilient implementable.
The rule given in the example above is not efficient which turns out instrumental in the failure of group resilient implementation. Below we show that any efficient and group strategy-proof rule is group resilient implementable.
Lemma 3.8. Let R N be the single-peaked preferences domain and let X determine the feasible set of the Sprumont model. Any efficient and group strategy-proof rule is groupresilient implementable.
Proof. Let f be an efficient and group strategy-proof rule. First, let us prove that f satisfies non-bossiness. In contrast, let f violate the property. Then there must exist R, i
= Ω, we must have two agents j = i and
. Efficiency requires that both f i (R) and f j (R) to be on the same side of the respective peaks of these players. The same is true for f i (R i , R −i ) and f j (R i , R −i ). Given that the peaks of these agents do not change between profiles R and (R i , R −i ), f i (R) and f i (R i , R −i ) are on the same side of p(R i ). The same thing is true for agent j . Consequently, by single-peakedness, one of i and j strictly prefers f (R i , R −i ) to f (R). Thus, one of i and j along with i can weakly block f (R). Thus, f is not group strategy-proof, a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that f violates non-bossiness in welfare. We have showed f satisfies non-bossiness. Thus, there must exist i, R andR i such that f (R i , R −i ) I i f (R) and
. By single peakedness, we find that f i (R i , R −i ) and f i (R) are on the different sides of p(R i ). Without loss of generality, we assume that
Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness imply that i cannot have any deviation
Moreover, strategyproofness and single-peakedness yield that
. This contradicts efficiency.
Next we identify some prominent rules in the Sprumont setting that are group resilient implementable. For this purpose, the following result is key.
Lemma 3.9. Let R N be the single-peaked preferences domain and let X determine the feasible set of the Sprumont model. If a decision rule f satisfies efficiency, strategyproofness and non-bossiness, then it is group resilient implementable.
Proof. Thanks to Theorem 3.1, it suffices to show that f non-bossy in welfare. Suppose otherwise. Then there must exist R ∈ R N , i ∈ N and
This means that f i (R i , R −i ) and f i (R) are on the opposite sides of p(R i ). Without loss of generality assume that
for some j, we can improve i and j by taking tiny amount from j's allocation and by increasing i's by the same amount. This implies
. This contradicts our earlier conclusion that Ω < j p(R j ).
The lemma above shows that any rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness and non-bossiness is group-resilient implementable. This class contains the whole family of fixed path rules by Moulin (1999) as well as the sequential allotment rules by Barbera et al. (1997) , and these two classes each contain the celebrated uniform rule. In contrast, Bochet and Sakai (2010) show that the only secure implementable rules within the fixed path rules are the priority rules, i.e., serial dictatorships.
Let us finally comment on the public goods model of Moulin (1980) . Unlike its counterpart in strict preferences domains, non-bossiness in welfare is not vacuously satisfied in this model. Thus, GTRP implementation is not equivalent to group strategy-proofness. However, the former is more demanding than the latter: the proof for this statement is identical to the one of Lemma 3.5. Thus, any GTRP implementable rule is also group resilient implementable. In addition, group strategy-proofness is equivalent to group resilient implementation for the class of efficient rules.
14 It is well-known that generalized median rules are group strategy-proof and efficient. Therefore, the set of group resilient implementable rules includes the whole class of generalized median voter rules.
14 In public good models, non-bossiness is vacuously satisfied. Thus, one needs to prove that groupstrategy proofness requires f be non-bossy in welfare. If
At the same time, group strategy-proofness implies that p(R j ) < f (R i , R −i ) for all j = i; otherwise, such an agent j and i together weakly improves from truthtelling by reporting (
Rich Domains
We now study group resilient implementation in a general environment. In the previous two subsections, we showed that group strategy proofness is implied by GTRP implementation in specific domains which in turn leads to the equivalence of GTRP and group resilient implementation. In general environments, such an equivalence is not necessarily true as shown in the example below.
Example 3.10. Narrow domain: strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare Let N = {1, 2} and X = {w, x, y, z}. Suppose that the set of preferences for each agent is R i ∪R i where
Now consider the following rule f :
Observe here that f satisfies strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare. Thus, f is GTRP implementable. Furthermore, f satisfies the rectangular property and is thus resilient implementable. However, f is not group resilient implementable. To see this, observe that in state R, only truthtelling delivers a which is the social alternative prescribed by f in R. However, R is not a strong Nash equilibrium because f (R) = d P i a = f (R) for both i = 1, 2.
The example above shows that group resilient implementation is not necessarily less demanding than resilient implementation.
A key feature for the failure of group strategy-proofness in the example above is the narrowness of the preference domain. When the preference domain is sufficiently "large", the combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare implies group strategy-proofness. We introduce below a richness condition on the preference domain which guarantees that the equivalence of GTRP and group resilient implementations.
such that x i P i y i P i z i for all z i ∈ A i with z i = x i and z i = y i .
If the domain R N is rich, then for any given agent i ∈ N and for any two alternatives x i , y i ∈ A i , there must exist preferences for agent i which place these alternatives as the top two alternatives. For instance, in private good economies the strict preference domain is rich. Clearly, any preference domain containing the strict preference domain is also rich. Furthermore, some domains not containing the strict preference domain are rich. For instance, suppose that the agents only care about their top two alternatives. Such domains would be rich as long any two alternatives are the top two at some point. However, some important domains of interest such as the single peaked domain in the Sprumont setting are not rich.
Theorem 3.11. Let R N be a rich domain. A decision rule f is group resilient implementable if and only if it is GTRP implementable.
Proof. Due to Theorem 3.2, it suffices to show that f is group strategy proof. Suppose otherwise. Then there exist R ∈ R N , S ⊆ N , and R S ∈ R S such that
LetR S ∈ R S be the preference for S such that
is the most preferred alternative for agent i underR i
does not change at any step of this process. Pick any i ∈ S. By construction ofR S , f i (R S , R −S ) is the most preferred alternative for agent i atR i . Then strategy-proofness of f yields that f i (R i , R S\{i} , R −S ) = f i (R S , R −S ). Now because f satisfies non-bossiness we get that f (R i , R S\{i} , R −S ) = f (R S , R −S ). Similar arguments apply for the remaining agents in S. Consequently, we have that f (R S , R −S ) = f (R S , R −S ). Recall that earlier we showed that f (R S , R −S ) = f (R). Thus, f (R) = f (R S , R −S ) which contradicts f (R S , R −S ) wdom[R, S] f (R).
Discussion and Extensions

Group Resilient Implementation vs. Group Secure Implementation
We showed that resilient implementability is more demanding than strategy-proofness alone but equivalent to secure implementation. Do the same relations hold for the group versions of these notions? We study this question in this section and introduce the group counterpart of secure implementation.
Observe here that we require the existence of a profile which is both a dominant strategy and a strong Nash equilibrium. At the same time each dominant or strong Nash equilibrium strategies should yield f (R). Hence no coalition can gain by deviating from truthtelling, and whenever f (R) = f (R), some coalition S can deviate fromR and strictly benefit.
We first note that in general environments, group resilient and group secure implementations are not equivalent. In fact, neither of the conditions is stronger than the other. For instance, the rule in our Example 3.3 is group resilient implementable but is not group secure implementable. The reason is that there is no profile which is both a SNE and a dominant strategy. In the next example, we provide a rule that is group secure implementable yet not group resilient implementable. Example 4.2. Group secure implementation does not imply group resilient implementation Let N = {1, 2} and X = {a, b, c, d, e, g}. Suppose that the set of preferences is R 1 ∪R 1 for agent 1 and R 2 ∪R 2 ∪R 2 for agent 2 where
Consider the following rule f :
One can easily see that f violates non-bossiness in welfare. For instance, at profile (R 1 ,R 2 ), agent 1 is indifferent between f (R 1 ,R 2 ) = c and f (R 1 ,R 2 ) = g. Thus, f is neither GTRP nor group-resilient implementable. On the other hand, it is easy to see that f is group-strategy proof. In addition, consider the Nash equilibria that yield a bad outcome at each profile. At profile R, the report (R 1 ,R 2 ) is a bad Nash equilibrium. However, agents 1 and 2 gain by deviating to (R 1 ,R 2 ). At profile (R 1 ,R 2 ), the report (R 1 ,R 2 ) is a bad Nash equilibrium. Again agents 1 and 2 profit by deviating to (R 1 ,R 2 ). At the remaining profiles, there are no bad Nash equilibria. Thus, any profile leading to a bad outcome is blocked by some group or an individual. Consequently, we find that f is group secure implementable but not group resilient implementable.
Finally, we note that when a rule f satisfies group strategy-proofness and is group resilient implementable then f is group secure implementable. Group strategy-proofness guarantees that truthtelling is both a dominant strategy and a SNE. Because no strategy profile which delivers a "wrong" outcome cannot be a GTRP equilibrium, all SNE and dominant strategy must deliver the "right" outcome. Our results from the previous sections identify many such rules. This is in stark contrast to the negative results obtained with secure implementation. Recall that if the domain of preferences is "large" enough, any group resilient implementable rule is group secure implementable. We close with a recall of our results under the light of group secure implementation. 
Relation to some Recent Literature and Departure from Equilibrium
Our notion of TRP implementation delivers results that can be compared with some recent studies, in particular Bergemann et al. (2011) and Saran (2016) . In the latter, if rationality is at least mutual knowledge -i.e. the minimal lower bound on the depth of rationality is k = 2-then Saran's notion of implementation under at most k-rationality implies rationalizable implementation. Note that for implementation under at most krationality, one of the key condition for the characterization is a combination of strategyproofness and a stronger version of non-bossiness than the one we use. As such his concept is more demanding than secure implementation, and recall that the latter is equivalent to resilient implementation, itself equivalent to implementation in truth-reversion proof equilibrium. Implementation in truth-reversion proof equilibrium also implies rationalizable implementation (for any cardinal representation). It is easy to see that under the responsiveness condition used in Bergemann et al. (2011) , resilient implementability of implies that f satisfies the strict set monotonicity condition pinned down in their paper.
We now discuss one possible relaxation of the equilibrium play requirement used in our paper.
Departure from equilibrium: Our notion of truth-reversion proof equilibrium implies that agents always hold the correct beliefs about the other agents' play while they only make an unsophisticated check to guarantee that a report is an equilibrium by simply anchoring on truthtelling. One may find these two aspects to be at odd with one another. We look at a relaxation of the requirement of equilibrium play one in the spirit of rationalizability.
Consider that we drop the requirement that beliefs agents hold are necessarily correct but maintain the assumption on primitive agents' behavior. Let us discuss here the strengthening on truth-reversion which simply requires agents to confront a preference relation to truthtelling for some beliefs about the other agents' play -not necessarily the correct ones. While rationalizability is about the elimination of never best response strategies, the next definition is about the elimination of preference reports which are never a best response against own truthtelling for some beliefs about the play of the other agents.
Immunity to truth-reversion: Fix rule f and i ∈ N . For any R i ,R i ∈ R i ,R i is immune to truth-reversion at
For each i ∈ N , let IT (R i |f ) be the set of i's preference reports that are immune to truth-reversion at R i . Note that IT (R i |f ) is non-empty since R i ∈ IT (R i |f ) by definition.
Immunity to truth-reversion implementation: Rule f is implementable in strategies immune to truth-reversion if for each R,R ∈ R N such that for each i ∈ N ,R i ∈ IT (R i |f ),
we have f (R) = f (R).
We introduce a new condition which is necessary for implementation in strategies immune to truth-reversion.
Global reversion: Rule f satisfies global reversion if for each R,R ∈ R N such that
To illustrate this concept, let us look at the following characterization of immunity to truth-reversion implementation for domains with strict preferences. Proof. Consider R,R ∈ R N such that f (R) = f (R). By definition of immunity to truth-reversion, we know that for each i ∈ N , R i ∈ IT (R i |f ). By the implementability requirement, it cannot be thatR i ∈ IT (R i |f ) for all i ∈ N . Hence there exists i ∈ N for whom f
We conclude that f must satisfies global reversion. To provide the other direction of the proof, suppose that f satisfies global reversion. Fix preference profile R ∈ R N and pick an alternative preference profilẽ
for allR −i . By the strict preference assumption we obtain in particular that f (R) = f (R). Hence f is implementable in strategies immune to truth-reversion.
Global reversion is a demanding condition. Obviously the more the rule varies across preference profiles, and the more stringent it becomes. Let us go to the extreme case where f changes at all profiles - Bergemann et al. (2011) define this condition as responsiveness.
Under responsiveness and global reversion, truthtelling is necessarily a strictly dominant strategy for all agents.
16 In contrast a rule is strategy-proof if truthtelling is a weakly dominant strategy for all agents. Note that global reversion implies both strategyproofness and the strong non-bossiness condition introduced by Saran (2016) . 17 We conclude that if f is implementable in strategies immune to truth-reversion it is also 16 Pick i ∈ N and fix R i ∈ R i . By responsiveness, for
. By global reversion, R i is a strictly dominant strategy at R i for agent i. 17 Rule f satisfies strong non-bossiness if for each i ∈ N , R,
implementable under at most k-rationality by the associated direct mechanism. Implementation in strategies immune to truth-reversion is therefore more demanding than implementation in truth-reversion proof equilibrium.
Truth-Reversion as a Property of Decision Rules
Our focus in the paper has been on a notion of robust behavioral implementation where agents' behavior may depart from the standard Nash implementation requirement. In connection with our motivation in terms of truthtelling as a focal point for agents, there is another important way to understand and evaluate some of the results we have obtained in the paper. We have alluded several times to truth-reversion as properties of social choice functions, see e.g. Remark 2.3. Let us define these properties more formally below and discuss how some our results can be re-interpreted under this different approach.
Group Reversion: Rule f satisfies group reversion if for each R,R ∈ R N such that
These two properties are new protective criteria that deal with situation where agents may end up at a "wrong" preference misreport, i.e. a lie. When a (group) strategyproof rule is responsive in the sense of (group) reversion, truthtelling is focal since any misreport can be "signaled" by a simple reversion to truthtelling. Perhaps importantly, and in contrast to the implementation approach taken in the paper, imposing either of the two properties on decision rules does not pre-suppose any type of behavioral departure from the standard rationality or pure-payoff maximization assumption. The focality of truthtelling comes out as a robustness requirement on rules, not one on specific behavioral assumption on agents, e.g. "primitive" vs "sophisiticated".
Note that reversion is more demanding than group reversion since for the former we require |S| = 1. Note also that both properties imply strategy-proofness -the other way around is obviously not true.
18 Following Remark 2.3 the adverted reader may have already noticed the connections between our implementation notions and the above two properties. Let us offer a motivation for this alternative approach. While the quest for appealing strategy-proof rules has been very successful, on the ground of truthtelling strategy-proof rules are typically put in the same indifference class. Indeed, the revelation principle asserts that a rule is implementable in dominant strategies if truthtelling 18 In contrast suppose that f satisfies group reversion but is not strategy-proof. This means that there
Then by group-resilience, there must exist S such that f (R S , R −S ) P j f (R i , R −i ) for all j ∈ S. Because the preferences for each j = i are the same under both (R S , R −S ) and (R i , R −i ), it must be that i ∈ S. Hence, f (R S , R −S ) = f (R) P i f (R i , R −i ), a contradiction with the initial assumption that
is a dominant strategy in its direct revelation mechanism. This requirement is simply strategy-proofness. Hence if one relies on the revelation principle, on the ground of truthtelling all strategy-proof rules are "equivalent". On the other hand, the reversion properties show that not all strategy-proof rules are equivalent. We claim that a rule works well if truthtelling can be seen as a focal point, a feature which is not a consequence of strategy-proofness. Note how the revelation principle is limited: it is silent regarding the rule's responsiveness to lies. We believe that this limitation makes at times truthtelling less salient than claimed in the quest for strategy-proof decision rules. Our stand here is that the more truthtelling seems "robust", the more agents are likely to coordinate on it. Indeed, the success of a strategy-proof decision rule should depend on agents' understanding that truthtelling is dominant. When an agent is somehow thinking of settling on a "bad" strategy, he should have the opportunity to compare this to a natural reference point. In a direct revelation mechanism, truthtelling is such a reference point. Yet as we argued it is not necessarily focal as the revelation principle is one-sided. Such an agent should be able to talk himself out of the "bad" strategy. If reversion to is always beneficial to some agents, it should make it obvious that the envisioned choice is "bad". Our stand is that truthtelling is focal (or prevalent) if agents do not want to move away from truthtelling, but also in case if they were away from it, some agent(s) could profitably revert to truthtelling.
There are some experimental results showing that a sizable fraction of subjects do not play dominant strategies a failure of implementation. Somehow subjects are convincing themselves that playing a "bad" strategy is a good idea. In particular, Cason et al. (2006 ), Saijo et al. (2007 show how agents may fail to identify and play their dominant strategies even if truthtelling is one of them, a feature which questions the salience of truthtelling. Both sets of authors observe that many strategy-proof rules of interest admit many unwanted Nash equilibrium in their direct revelation mechanisms. This seems problematic as such rules typically perform poorly in practice, with agents failing to identify their dominant strategies and getting stuck at unwanted Nash equilibria. In conjunction with the insights from Cason et al. (2006 ), Saijo et al. (2007 introduce the additional protective criterion of secure implementation which requires full double implementation in dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium. More recently, Li (2016) introduces the new robustness notion of obvious strategy-proofness. Li's notion is a robustness notion motivated by agents' cognitive limitations, arguing that some strategyproof mechanisms are easier to understand than others.
Let us now list some results in light of the reversion properties. For more details and to find some of the omitted proofs, the reader is referred to Bochet and Tumennasan (2017a) . The above corollary provides a new, intuitive and easy-to-check necessary and sufficient condition for secure implementation. As we argued before, checking whether a rule satisfies reversion is no more demanding than checking that it satisfies strategy-proofness.
(ii) Results on group reversion: Proposition 4.9. Rule f satisfies group reversion if and only if f satisfies both strategyproofness and non-bossiness in welfare.
As we have shown in the paper, there are many rules of interest which satisfies strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare. In that sense, the latter property has a somewhat unexpected strategic implication on strategy-proof rules. We obtain the corollary below as a direct consequence of Proposition 4.9. Recall the characterization of secure implementation of Saijo et al. (2007) in terms of strategy-proofness, non-bossiness in welfare and the outcome rectangular property. Pick a rule that satisfies the first two properties but fail the latter, then any "bad" Nash equilibrium in its direct revelation mechanism can be broken by a reversion to truthtelling for some group of agents. As such, many of the negative results obtained on secure implementation vanish once pre-play communication among agents is possible. And they vanish in a rather unexpected way since breaking a Nash equilibrium is in the form of reversion to truthtelling. Hence a strategy-proof rule which satisfies non-bossiness in welfare should be expected to work well in practice because truthtelling is focal for such a rule. It appears that truthtelling may have an even more prominent role in some models discussed in the mechanism design literature. In a related paper, Bochet and Tumennasan (2017b) , we specialize to the Sprumont model and show a striking result: for all strategy-proof rules discussed in the literature, truthtelling is actually Paretodominant within the set of Nash equilibria of their direct revelation mechanisms -and in addition the set of Nash equilibria is a complete lattice.
Next, in several models and domains of interest, group reversion will automatically imply (or be equivalent) to group strategy-proofness.
Corollary 4.11. Let R N be the strict preference domain and let F determine a private good economy. A rule f satisfies group reversion if and only if f satisfies group strategyproofness.
Corollary 4.12. Let R N be the single-peaked domain, let F determine the feasible set of the Sprumont model, and let rule f satisfies efficiency. Then f satisfies group reversion if and only if it satisfies group strategy-proofness.
Corollary 4.13. Let R N be a rich domain. If rule f satisfies group reversion then f satisfies group strategy-proofness.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have achieved two different objectives which are seemingly unrelated. The first one was to study a new notion of implementation rooted in the observation that the number of strategies that agents typically face in applied mechanism problem may be too big to be handled. The rule of thumb that we introduced was to assume that agents always make comparisons to truthtelling, a feature which we believe is salient in applied problems because agents understand very well the notion of truth versus non-truth. The notion of robust behavioral implementation we have studied shows how stringent this assumption can be in the absence of communication between agents. Once communication is allowed, we recovered many positive results which showed also that the limits of secure implementation may not be so severe. In particular a consequence of some of our results is that the unbreakable "bad" Nash equilibria that make secure implementation to fail are often very fragile. From this we come to our second objective which is to see truthreversion as a property imposed directly on decision rules. While it occupies a smaller portion of the paper, this nonetheless delivers one of the striking feature of our approach.
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As with Li (2016)'s notion of obviously strategy-proof rules, our reversion properties are yet another set of protective properties whose main goal is to make sure that rules work well in practice. The connection between the reversion properties and our results in terms of implementation shows that any rule which satisfies either or the two would work well in practice since it can be implemented when agents are either primitives or sophisticated. Once our two objectives are combined, one gets the full strength of the results obtained in the paper.
There are of course several open questions which are left untouched. We list a few. First we have confined our attention to functions rather than correspondences, and we know from the literature that moving away from the single-valuedness requirement delivers more permissive results. In conjunction with this remark, we have used direct mechanisms as a natural starting point. One could extend this approach and look for instance at a class of indirect mechanisms where agents are asked to report not only their own preference relations but also other components. Finally, our results on truthreversion implementation come out as rather negative -recall its equivalence with secure implementation. One could take a different route and relax the exact implementation requirement, as in Abreu and Sen (1991) and in particular Bochet and Maniquet (2010) . We leave these questions open for future research.
